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INSTRUMENTALISM AND ACTION

THE place which the practical fills and the function which it performs in the philosophy of pragmatism have never been clear; nor are they made much clearer by instrumentalism. In spite of the constant emphasis on practice, an ambiguity has remained, and still remains. Is practice a special case of metaphysical principles to be found elsewhere in their generality and most characteristic form; or is practice itself the source to which we should look for our basic categories?

At times Dewey looks to action for metaphysical categories. "The ultimate evidence of genuine hazard, contingency, irregularity and indeterminateness in nature is thus found in the occurrence of thinking."[1] This evidence does not consist in a logical demonstration; the reality of contingency does not follow deductively from logical premises. The evidence lies in the irrationality of the predicaments in which man finds himself constantly involved. It is the brute, problematic situations confronting him, about which he must do something if he is to survive, that furnish final proof of the reality of contingency. To take another example, action is not something derivative from the existence of sense-data and the inference that they are signs of realities which gave rise to them by stimulating the organism. On the contrary, the irreducible fact is that we are engaged in action, and sense-data are inferences from, or analytically discerned components of, action, not elements from which it is constructed, or prior facts on which it rests. Here are two important categories of philosophy, contingency and the sensory given, which are to be found in action, their ultimate locus.

There are, on the other hand, reasons for denying that action is of special significance for metaphysics. Action involves choice, and choice is for the sake of the better alternative; it is directed toward the fulfillment of purpose and the realization of value. But purpose and value can not be imputed to all nature, for their existence depends on the presence of special, organic conditions. Existence does not imply value, and so we must turn to studies of existence for our clues to the general traits of being, that is, to the

[1] *Experience and Nature*, p. 69.

sciences. Action and morals are special cases of scientific truth, not themselves constitutive of nature. The practical is a special case of the theoretical, in the sense that for an understanding of it we must turn to theoretical science; it is not self-explanatory. Action can best be understood and described by such sciences as biology, physiological psychology, and sociology, building on the achievements of physics and chemistry. To take a simple illustration, I may need wood for a fire, but it would be absurd to define wood in terms of my momentary need. To understand the nature of wood, I must go to the scientist who will tell me, if I wish, what it is as a natural object, neutral as regards my wants, and who will aid me in choosing the kind of wood best suited to my purpose, whatever it may be. Science supplies indispensable tools for intelligent action, if we will only use them, but they are there independent of practice. Science as an end in itself gives knowledge of nature, which has potential application to practical problems, but it is not in itself that application.

But is science an end in itself? In other words, is it really science, or is it art?[2] This is the issue at the basis of the problem of the status of the practical. To say that science is art is to say that there is no difference in logical principle between the methods of science and those of technology. Now there is a sense in which this is true for the pragmatist. For knowledge itself is a kind of action, and action is the key to the methods of both science and technical art. Yet, it is not very enlightening to lump all human experience together under the single head of action. It can of course be said, if one wishes, that science and technology, which is a kind of art, are two sorts of action. Then we shall have noted the difference between theoretical and practical action. But to employ the term "action" in such a broad sense as this usage implies, without adding a careful analysis of the differences between the theoretical and the practical, is to strip the term of so much meaning that it loses its usefulness. It then becomes such a broad category that, like experience, it denotes a philosophic method rather than a special subject-matter. But the concept of

[2] Art or production is only one branch of the practical, the other being moral action. Philosophy, when identified with morals in the broad sense, must be taken to include both, art being an instrument of effective action. All these are concerned with value, and involve a partial separation of means and ends. Such seems to be the position of instrumentalism. In contrasting the theoretical and the practical, the latter will be referred to either as art or as morals, since the distinctions are not relevant to the discussion. The common goal of purposeful activity, theoretical as well as practical, is esthetic experience, in which such separations as means and end, had and known, premise and conclusion, are overcome. This goal is never completely attained, but can be approximated in any sphere of experience.

action ought to be the primary category, underlying the emphasis on consequences which constitutes the true method of pragmatism; it ought not itself to be given a merely methodological significance. The old, common-sense differences between science and art must reappear if the distinction between theoretical and practical action is to be fruitful. Otherwise we shall have only created confusion, instead of making progress. The value of science may well lie in its instrumentality, the uses to which it is put to satisfy human needs. But to recognize this is not to make value constitutive of the nature of science. The nature of science is to describe, in general terms, the causal mechanisms of nature. To say that science is art is to describe it in terms of the moral and esthetic functions it may and no doubt ought to assume; but to identify its nature with these functions is to misunderstand it. There must be such a thing as science in the first place, to perform the functions, and this would be no less true if the highest end of life were the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.

On the side of the identification of science and art two points may be urged by the instrumentalist. In the first place it can be said that all thinking, and therefore scientific thinking as well, is an art, exhibiting the creative nature of art, and the union of premises and conclusions, means and ends, that is characteristic of esthetic and all other value. Second, such entities of science as the electron are not individual existents, rivals of the macroscopic things of direct experience, but concepts. Assuming that we can speak significantly about "science" as a whole, it follows that if science as an end in itself is the investigation of a special class of objects, it will be either purely formal, a study of concepts and their relations, or else it must remain on the macroscopic level. Either way of understanding this latter alternative is flagrantly at odds with common sense, and so we must adopt the former, namely, that concepts are instrumental, and the essence of science lies in its application. This identification would place the practical before the theoretical, and make the latter a special case of the former, for art is admittedly practical.

But the arguments on the side of a differentiation are at least equally strong. First, as distinguished from science, philosophy is the criticism of values, and not in the abstract but as a matter of practical concern. It is morals, but in such a broad sense as scarcely to be distinguished from art. It would seem, then, that philosophy is queen of the arts, not of the sciences; for certainly art is criticism of values, and its intent, like that of philosophy, is to increase the sum of value in the world. As art, philosophy is not a form of knowledge superior to science, giving a unique in-

sight into the nature of reality. The philosopher, if his work is to have a relation to reality, needs knowledge, and to get it he must pursue the same methods as the scientist, and work experimentally and critically. Moreover, the general pursuit of value requires equally general means to its end. The mechanisms of nature are means, and the philosopher will need a general conception of the workings of nature, a comprehensive view of things, to pursue his end successfully. Science investigates existence, and if the philosopher wishes to understand existence, as he must, it would be absurd for him to ignore what science has to tell him. It is precisely because science is concerned with existence, art and philosophy with value, that the philosopher is so dependent on the scientist for knowledge about the world as it is.

In the second place, it can not be denied or glossed over that in some final sense science deals with antecedent existence, and art with eventual existence, that science is a knowledge of conditions, art of consequences. Is there no place for antecedent existence in a philosophy which starts with an emphasis on consequences? Of course there is; instrumentalism is naturalism, and nature exists for the naturalist independently of its being known. Here we skirt epistemological controversies, but are not caught up in them, if we are careful. Knowledge always essentially involves consequences, but it never consists entirely in those consequences, for it always has, directly or indirectly, a reference to natural existent fact. Any other theory would ignore the distinction between fact and fancy, and instrumentalism is far too close to realities to do that.

The reference of knowledge to existent natural fact is conformity; but knowing is never simply a passive conformity or copying. The consequences of some ideas prove that they do not conform to or fit the facts, and their employment leads to conflict with fact. But sometimes the conformity of ideas to facts does exist; and when it does it always goes further, for knowledge is an interaction, while conformity is only a static relation. One might say that conformity is the static and working the dynamic element in knowing, and that the first can be discovered only through the second. The conformity results from the fact that ideas have structure, and if they are true their structures must follow or be abstracted from those of nature. But ideas also have consequences; they change both knower and known through the interaction that is knowing. The knower acts more intelligently than he did when he was ignorant, and the intelligence of his action is based on conformity to nature, both in its present actuality, and even more in its potentiality. The known object has potentialities

which will be realized only in action upon it, and conformity to its potentialities is therefore for practice more important than conformity to its present actuality. At the same time, apart from practical action in the sense of art, knowing itself is a realization of some of the prior potentialities of natural existence, since it bestows meaning, and meaning is present in nature as a potentiality. And here, too, in order for the added meaning to be true, it must rest on a prior conformity of structure. Everywhere in knowledge conformity and working go together. The statement that man is a practical being means that he can not discover antecedent existence without going beyond it; no more than this. This is what instrumentalism must say, if science and art are distinct.

The explanation of the apparent confusion between science and art lies in the instrumentalist doctrine of knowledge. If we ask whether knowledge is of the universal or of the particular, the general answer of instrumentalism is that all knowledge is of the particular, since thinking is the attempt to deal with problematic situations, and a problematic situation is always particular. This is the greatest point of difference between instrumentalist and Aristotelian (as well as strictly formal) logic. Not universal ideas, which are instrumental, but things and events, are the true objects of knowledge. Nevertheless, science seeks general laws, and laws are universal. Because of this, it might seem that scientific knowledge is still of the universal, of form and structure, and that if science supplies the pattern of knowledge, the particular is unknowable, the object of art only, as the Greeks said. Science seeks its laws, however, through experiment, and so the scientist too is always dealing with particular situations. But he is not for that reason an artist. Science seeks universals, although in order to do so it employs an art of inquiry; while art, including its special form, technology, applies this knowledge to particulars. In science, action is for the sake of knowledge, while in art knowledge is for the sake of action. No doubt there is art in science, and science in art. Science as a self-contained activity has esthetic value, and its pursuit requires an endowment of the creative, artistic imagination. The artist, on the other hand, must know science, the more the better. But this interweaving, and after all there is interweaving between all forms of human activity, does not destroy the differences.

To sum up, art and science are closely related. For although one deals primarily with value, and the other with existence, art deals with existence, too, since naturally occurring values form a segment of existence; and science exhibits many of the traits of art—for instance, being a human pursuit, it rests on preference,

and so is the pursuit of value. But in spite of similarities and overlapping, the two are distinct in aim. If such physical entities as atom, electron, and light wave are not individual existents, the relational structures physics describes, at any rate, are real entities in nature, whose presence is the condition of the occurrences of qualities. In this way, it must be said that the aim of science is the discovery of antecedent conditions. Art, on the other hand, employs conditions in order to bring about further consequences, in order to change nature in a certain direction; its aim is the realization of consequences. If instrumentalism denied this, it would be false to its distinction between existence and value. There is a clear distinction between science on the one hand, and art, morals, and philosophy on the other.

In order clearly to understand the relation between theory and practice, however, it is necessary to consider instrumentalism from a somewhat more systematic point of view. There are four important types of relation which stand out prominently: cause and effect, condition and consequent, premise and conclusion, means and end. They characterize, respectively, nature, science, logic, and value. The first and last relations are clearest, for they characterize, respectively, natural existence, whose parts are causally related, and value, which depends on a system of means-end relationships. The others show properties of their own, but are nevertheless derivative from these, so far as the basic points of reference are existence and value. The term "end" has two principal meanings; an end is either the terminus of a process in nature or it is a deliberately chosen goal. If science is reducible to art, it is concerned with end in the second sense; if it is not, science is the attempt to state generally in the form of conditions and consequents the particular causal or sequential relations found in nature, and to describe beginnings and endings in the first sense. It is not, in the second case, concerned with means and ends except in the incidental sense that the pursuit of science is a preferred end, and that among the facts of science will be the fact that certain organisms do prefer certain ends.

Let us scrutinize these various relations more closely. In a word, we may say that an effect is a related quality, a consequent is a predicted effect, a conclusion is a formally validated consequent, and an end is a preferred consequent or conclusion. Existence is made up of events, which follow one another in sequential order; this order is itself the causal order, the preceding event being the cause of the succeeding. Nature is not the scene of conflict between compelling forces; it is rather a history of conjunctions: this and this and this. The first of two terminal qualities

might be called cause, the second effect; the causal relation is the natural process of change which is the transition from the first to the second, however, and in this sense natural qualities are always effects, while the events of which they are terminations are the causes of them; but to say this is merely to state an historical order. Qualities are static, historic change is dynamic. Science abstracts structural patterns from history, and calls them laws; they describe, preferably in quantitative terms, relations of conditions and consequents which have repeatedly occurred, and will probably recur again in the future. Finally, the successful pursuit of value requires a knowledge of means, of which the only present dependable source is science; and valuing activities apply scientific laws as means to ends. Thus the series of relations forms an arc: existence, abstraction, application. Natural and moral relations are both specific, characterizing unique, concrete situations. Science, between the two extremes, is general.

This arc theoretically includes logical and mathematical relations, but actually they play only a minor part. They might be powerful instruments of morality, if we knew how to use them better than we do. But as things are, they developed chiefly as ends in themselves, and then became instruments of science, while it is chiefly science that has been an actual and is now still more an intended instrument of morality. There is a reason for this. The laws of science indicate possible operations on physical objects, while the formulae of logic state possible mental operations on symbols. These operations become actualized in the practice of science and logic. But the systems of logic and mathematics abstract to the second degree from nature. They may be accepted or rejected by the scientist on the basis of their utility, but in themselves they have their own criterion of validity. The theoretical is that which is applicable to any possible situation, and logic and mathematics are theoretical, derived from but referring eventually to existence. Logic, like science, lies between the extremes of nature and value. Like science, it is general, but it is more general than science. So far as the practical is the last word, science will be more important than logic, and the scientific relations more prominent than logical relations, because the distance between the absolutely general and the particular is too great to be easily crossed; the knowledge of a circumscribed sphere of existence which experience gives is more readily applicable than the knowledge of the possibilities of existence in general. For both science and logic, if something then something else; but the conditions of science, although only probable, compensate by being more localized; if our ends are relatively immediate, our means must be also.

Hence logical relations often drop out of sight in instrumentalism, leaving nature, science, and morals, with science mediating between original, natural existence and morals.

The four types of relations form a hierarchy, in which each realizes something that was only potential in its predecessor. Science realizes meanings that are latent in nature, says instrumentalism, but only latent because science bestows on events additional meanings which are not actually present in nature as immediately experienced, though nature contains the basis for them. There is structure in nature, yet nature is particular; in abstracting structure, science achieves generality. Logic similarly yields meanings which are abstracted from existence; yet we can not say that formal logic actually exists in nature, or even in science. Finally, means and the preferred ends to which they lead are natural entities and relations, and yet ends in the primitive sense have to be changed into ends in the moral sense by intention and action, in order to be actualized. The potentiality which is progressively realized through the hierarchy is internality. A consequent is a related effect, and science draws together events and qualities which were only externally and conjunctively together in nature. The relation between premise and conclusion is closer than that between condition and consequent, because its formal character releases it from the contingencies of nature, which are externalities —except, of course, so far as the thinking of the logician introduces natural contingency again. But until the logician attains an esthetic vision of the relations he is studying in their totality, an immediate appreciation which unites premises and conclusions as means and ends, the internality is not complete. The ideal of value is the realization of the complete union of means and ends in a single experience, where nothing is merely instrumental or merely final, and every element is both; but this ideal can only be approximated, as was said above, since man is a part of nature, and subject to the brute intrusions of nature which thwart him in spite of all he can do.

The hierarchy, however, is an abstraction, since all types of relation are to be found in a single experience, and themselves in close relation with one another. The relations and the existents in which they occur are themselves related mutually in experience. Science is the condition of morality, if we mean by morality intelligent action; morality rests upon science as its prior condition. The production of shoes, clothing, and houses is or should be a moral pursuit, and success depends on knowing how to produce these goods as scientifically as possible, with the greatest economy of means. The pursuit of any aim, social or private, noble or

base, worldly or unworldly, requires a similar economy and relevance of means, resting on scientific knowledge. On the other hand, morality is the condition of science, in that man is originally practical; science is an offshoot of daily living, developed as an instrument to serve its needs, and causal conditions are the servants of moral use. At the same time, both science and morals are outgrowths of nature, and the relationships developed by both, so far as they are true, depend on the actual constitution of natural events; natural relations are the foundation of both scientific and moral relations. And logical and mathematical relations, like the others, depend on the relations existing in brute nature, in the last analysis.

These observations lead us back to the discussion over the relative positions of science and art, theory and practice, in philosophy. Instrumentalism is a naturalistic philosophy, and it is always worth while asking whether the naturalist takes nature to be solely a descriptive term or gives it a normative meaning as well. Can it be said in any real sense that either the world described by science, or the world of art, is more "natural" than the other? Nature, as Aristotle noted long ago, can mean either the beginning or the end, the acorn or the oak. But which does it more truly mean? It means the end, "for it is reasonable to believe that the most adequate definition of the traits of natural existence can be had only when its properties are most fully displayed—a condition which is met in the degree of the scope and intimacy of interactions realized. . . . 'Effects,' since they mark the release of potentialities, are more adequate indications of the nature of nature than are just 'causes.'"[3] The hierarchy of relations begins with nature as potentiality, and ends with art and morals as the realization of potentiality. In nature, qualities are the effects of processes, events, and forces which science describes; and it was through learning to treat qualities as effects rather than causes that science was enabled to advance. But in man, esthetic and moral qualities tend more and more to be causes, final causes, while the natural forces of science tend more and more to become instruments, which are analogous to effects.

Here are two orders, and both are orders of nature. Science describes in conceptual terms what nature in the first sense is; morality and art tell us what nature in the second sense partly is, and even more might be. Science is concerned with efficient causes operative in nature, morality and art with final causes. Morality and art are concerned with efficient causes too, but they try to transform them, and achieve as complete a union of means

[3] *Experience and Nature*, p. 262.

and ends as possible; so far as they succeed, efficient causes will be absorbed into final causes. And yet the priority of art over nature is practical, not theoretical or constitutive. What might be is more important than what is, but what is precedes what might be, and is always the condition of it. In the living organism the existent comes to strive after value, and is practically determined by value; and this determination is as absolute as any kind of determination can be, for to be living is to prefer ends. And yet, the appearance of organisms and value in the universe is a highly contingent, and probably recent, fact. It must be treated as such; and philosophy, to achieve its proper universality, must be based on pure science, the study of existence, and not on moral practice, in order to arrive at general categories.

Through what kind of experience can we reach reality? Many philosophers have replied, Through scientific experience: the sciences, and any other experiences which may be governed by scientific methods, alone tell us what the world really is. Others have denied this, and insisted that modes such as art or religion are equally valid, or even superior. There are many modes of experience, and two of the most significant are theory and practice; or, in terms of our discussion, science and morality. Now, as we have seen, instrumentalism tends to give science first place, so far as metaphysics is concerned. And yet, the doubt continually recurs to what degree instrumentalism has a metaphysics; for its metaphysics would seem to rest on a theory of nature, but it is very reluctant to commit itself about the nature of nature. So, although the primacy of morality may be only practical, it is nevertheless a very important primacy. In short, the answer to the question just posed seems to be that each mode of experience is valid in its own sphere; the attitudes of science and morality are both true.

But it is impossible to stop here; these modes are too different to be left in simple conjunction; either one must be made primary and the other derivative, or one must be discovered in the other, or they must be synthesized and related by some further principle. But instrumentalism adopts none of these alternatives; it leaves the two standing side by side, and adopts now one, now the other. Nature means sometimes the beginning, and sometimes the end. In a comprehensive philosophy, it must no doubt mean both, but the difficulty is that here we are not shown how it can mean both. For the statement that the world of morality gradually evolved out of the world described by science can not be accepted as satisfactory, without some adequate doctrine of potentiality to relate the two. It can not be accepted without a metaphysics, and

emergent evolution is not a metaphysics. For all his sympathy with the Greeks, Dewey rejects their forms and final causes: to make teleology constitutive throughout nature is the first step on the road that leads toward compensatory dreams, and away from effective action. It is the beginning of that historical tendency toward escape mechanisms which has tainted philosophy to this day. It is one of the two forms of belief in antecedent existence which have been responsible for most of the ills of philosophy—the other being the copy theory of knowledge which was the beginning of the blind alley of epistemology. But without a teleology, emergent evolution has a very restricted significance. Is it an explanation to say that mind is the actualization of natural potentialities, that mind emerges when events attain a certain complexity of organization? This is simply to reiterate what everyone can see: there is matter in the world, and there is mind. Philosophy must be description rather than explanation, in the sense that we can not derive everything from a principle or set of principles that are seen to be logically necessary; but it does not follow that philosophy is a catalogue. Emergent evolution is not philosophy but the abdication of philosophy. We can not deny evolution, and evolution implies emergence of the novel; but the simple narrative of levels of complexity is neither science nor philosophy—it juxtaposes without relating. Emergent evolution is not able to relate the worlds dealt with by science and morality, and it is the only form of relation offered by instrumentalism, the only attempt to describe nature comprehensively and systematically.

There are four types of priority involved in the four types of relation discussed above—logical priority, causal priority, and so on—but one significant type is missing, namely, metaphysical priority. It has no place in instrumentalism. It might be maintained that metaphysics is simply the sum of all the other relations, that when we have described the characteristic relations that hold in nature, science, logic, and value, we have a complete philosophy, and have described the general traits of existence. There is strength in this objection, for it is true that this is a large part of metaphysics. But it is not the whole, for we still lack a principle to relate them, and until such a principle is supplied, a philosophy is not complete.

If the heart of pragmatism is the emphasis on consequences, then pragmatism must rest on a theory of action. We have not yet had from pragmatism an analysis of action, and indeed philosophy has always too much neglected it. Consciousness focuses on the unusual and the problematic, and perhaps this accounts

for the neglect, at least among pragmatists. For action has been such a familiar concept to them, omnipresent in their discussions, that its nature has not seemed to present a problem. Its analysis will not be easy, just because that which is always present is hardest to understand; but until it has been carried out, the philosophy of pragmatism will remain fragmentary and disjointed. It is the proper and inevitable approach to metaphysics for anyone who accepts the initial tenet of pragmatism.

When instrumentalism takes the comprehensive view of nature proper to the metaphysician, rather than the restricted view appropriate to the methodologist, it turns its attention to the category of interaction; but this category is only indicated, not explored or defined. Dewey has said that experience is a natural interaction, but instead of asking what interaction generically is, he has enumerated the various types to be found at different levels of nature. In the same way, he speaks frequently of contingency and potentiality, but has no explicit doctrine about either of them. He has been keen in pointing out the presence of such important factors in rough experience; but his mistrust of barren, speculative dogmatism, and his desire to root out from philosophy fruitless epistemological discussions, have precluded the analysis of those categories which recent philosophy had neglected, and to which he has again called attention, and of the new category which he has presupposed rather than explored.

Metaphysics is the analysis of the generic traits of the real, and the accounts given by philosophers of such traits have differed largely because individual philosophers have not been in agreement as to what that real fact is, which constitutes their point of departure. Now pragmatism accepts natural interaction as the most important generic trait of existence, but interaction does not occur generically, only in various forms. It must therefore be examined in one or more specific forms. The form which should be selected for analysis is that which is best known, namely, action on the human level; and its examination will result in the metaphysics of pragmatism. Philosophy can only describe the empirical traits of existence, and it must proceed empirically in its task, as do the other branches of inquiry. But there are many possible kinds of description, of which the most primitive is enumeration. If traits are simply denoted in succession, we shall end with a catalogue, in which the only order and unity is the conjunctive succession of psychological discovery, or the historical succession of temporal emergence. We may, however, fix our attention on a complex fact, which will be the point of reference for our discoveries, and supply the ordering principle for what we find. Action

is such a complex fact. The categories discernible in it will be descriptive, for they are empirically discoverable, but they will also be explanatory, in that through their relations and interactions they will enable us to understand better what action is; while, reciprocally, action is what binds them together and organizes them into the pattern of actual existence.

The modern attitude of suspicion toward metaphysics and explanation goes back to the early history of modern science, to the reasonable claim of the scientist that every factor to be considered by him must be an integral part of the system he set out to describe. He was ruling out a transcendent theological God and a transcendent teleological soul. Metaphysics during this period gradually came to be identified with theories of transcendent entities which had no causal connection with the system of nature. The adoption of the scientific approach by philosophers was a great step forward, for it meant the principle that nothing is admissible which makes the world unintelligible by splitting it in two. But this is a repudiation of mystery and superstition, not of metaphysics. Metaphysics is ruled out only when some one or two partial categories, relations, or factors, such as final causality or the causality of physical science, are asserted to be the only one or ones in existence. Instrumentalism does not assert the exclusive reality of physical causality, for it maintains that ends of action are real factors in the process of action, whereas physical science knows nothing of such ends; nor does it rest on the exclusive assertion of any other partial categories. Consequently it is not inherently anti-metaphysical. But it has not pursued the analysis of action, suspicious lest it should turn out to be a reintroduction of occult or transcendent forces in a new guise. Consequently, process and action for instrumentalism consist simply in "this and this and this." Philosophy is history, and history is pure narrative. This may or may not be good history, but it certainly is not good metaphysics.

The function of metaphysics is to discover those categories which are embedded in the process of nature and experience, and to show what their effectiveness severally and collectively is. These categories have, not a logical or causal, but a metaphysical priority, in nature; they are the generic traits of existence, without which it would not be. Their effectiveness is that of factors immanent in the process. The reason why instrumentalism has failed to give an account of such factors is that it has had an erroneous conception of what metaphysics is. Repudiating a superstitious theology, it has gone to the other extreme, and embraced a positivistic, scientific methodology. This is why Dewey, although

he constantly talks in terms of processes and events, never says what he means by either. To do so would be to treat experience not as a method but as action.

The neglect of action as an object of study by modern philosophers is explained by their presuppositions. The classical philosophers missed the concept because action is of the whole individual, with which they were seldom concerned. Those who accepted the sharp contrast of thought and extension failed to explain how thought could ever be translated into motion; yet no fact of experience is more obvious than the eventuation of thought in action. Those who followed the lead of the physicists accepted the formula, action and reaction are always equal; to them action was simply reaction. The philosophy of the associationists was an attempt to adapt this formula to human nature; for it formulated, although somewhat loosely, a mechanical theory of mental processes. The transcendental idealists worked on the principle that action is spontaneous origination, and to them action was creation. Determinism, chance, and creation have been the foundations of most theories of change in the modern world; and they all imply that change is either mere reaction, or creation from nothing—whether that creation be sheer, blind chance, the act of an ego, or the act of a benevolent creator. But action is neither reaction nor creation. It proceeds not from a mind or from a body, but from the whole individual, in an environment containing alternatives and potentialities. It is the directed exertion of energy on the part of the individual, in the face of an unsolved, problematic situation. It involves thought, but is more than thought. The unit of change is an action, which proceeds from a need to its satisfaction, or from a problem to its resolution. It is a process of modifying and relating, for at the end the individual has modified his environment in some way, and been changed by it in some way, with respect both to knowledge and to mode of life. Individual and environment are more closely related than they were before, and yet are more completely themselves, since each has acquired some trait of its own that had until then been only possible or potential.

A theory of experience from the point of view of action has never been developed in philosophy, because those who have studied the practical have been for the most part moralists, interested in what might be or should be, rather than what is; while those who have turned to experience for an account of existence have followed other clues than action—such as sensations, concepts, feelings, and sentiments. But the unity of experience is not the unity of awareness of sense data spread out as a surface pattern; what is given is given for action, and is not a set of sense data given for con-

templation. Purpose relates the data into a pattern and order of relevance, as they are discriminated within the total situation. Nor is the unity of experience that of judgment, the combination or analysis of concepts. Neither is it a unity of esthetic emotion, integrating a collection of data which are finally felt in a pattern. All these are components in a kind of unity which is more comprehensive than any of them. This is the unity of action, dominated by its own structure and by the end at which the action aims.

The contention of the present argument is that such a study, if carried through, will yield categories of general and not merely human significance. It will give us, not experience and nature, but experience as nature; in understanding experience we shall also understand nature, if experience really is a natural fact. The axiom on which the argument rests is, that all the basic categories of existence are exemplified in human experience. The maxim which must always be kept in mind in searching for those categories is to distinguish carefully between a category in its generality and the special form it assumes in human experience. Such an analysis will be the formulation of a naturalistic metaphysics. It will not contain the details of scientific knowledge and theory that frequently appear in philosophical discussions of science and nature, but it is not the province of philosophy to incorporate such details. Philosophers should be happy if they succeed in formulating only a few very general categories. Only the dualist believes that this procedure will anthropomorphize nature. If nature and its processes are one, why should we not start with that part of nature which is ourselves? The reason for beginning with ourselves is not that we must of necessity do so, for that is not true. It is rather that all philosophy is morals, in the last analysis, and should therefore start at the center rather than the periphery. But whether we begin with an ethical method for the stabilization and increase of values, or with a scientific method for the investigation of nature, which is instrumental to the first, a method is not enough. Morality by itself is only half a philosophy and requires a metaphysic to complete it. And in this age of methodology above all, it should be clear that the way to metaphysics lies through the practical. By the analysis of action we shall arrive at a metaphysics that has some relevance to morals, since it grew out of the basic moral fact.

The danger of anthropomorphizing the cosmos is, however, a real one, and the only guarantee against it is care in analysis. How find the relation between man and nature, without reducing one to the other? In general, there are two ways by which the relation may be achieved. We may view the one as a realization

of some qualities which were only potential in the other. This is the way that Aristotle took, for whom existence in the widest sense is a process of the gradual actualization of potentialities. Or we may regard any individual fact as a complex of various component factors, and explain the differences between facts as due to the various ways in which the component factors, present in all, are related in different cases, and to the dominance of some factors over others. This is the method of Plato. The first method tends to be genetic and historical; the second is predominantly analytic. The first requires a theory of potentiality and actuality, and a general tendency toward the realization of potentiality, in order to make sense; and the weakness of most recent philosophies of evolution is that they have lacked such a theory. The second demands not a cosmic tendency toward the realization of potentiality, but factors within the individual fact or event which account for its distinctive character, and for the appearance of novelties here and now, in a specific instance. This also involves a theory of potentiality, but of a different sort. The first way tends to lose the individual in the sweep of the universal process; the second, on the other hand, finds the universal in the individual. The first thinks in terms of the past and the future; the second, in terms of the present.

The philosophy of Dewey is genetic and evolutionary; and like the evolutionary movement, beginning in the last century, which inspired it, it illustrates a healthy reaction against speculation which is rationalistic in the sense of ignoring history. The genetic approach is valuable, and philosophy can no more ignore history than it can analytic physical science. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, the present must give the clue to the past and the future, and not conversely: this is the limitation of genetic explanations. Dewey tends to lean upon the past for his account of what is, and on the future for his account of what ought to be. The world we live in exists chiefly in terms of habits derived from the past; except for the problematic situation at the focus of attention, our familiar world is that of the past. The broad features of existence are to be discovered by a survey of the ascending levels of nature to man; and the key to human nature lies in the accounts of man furnished by anthropology, and sociology, in their descriptions of primitive peoples. Value, on the other hand, is to be discovered by experiment, by prediction upon an hypothesis, and future verification; the good is not so much what man was or is, as what he may some day become through the application of intelligence to his own behavior.

These remarks present one side of the picture, and so are an

overstatement, for no philosophy completely ignores the present and its character. As regards existence, the simpler forms of nature and the more primitive modes of human life are to be found in the present as well as the past, and Dewey, of course, knows this well. Nevertheless, emergent evolution has the tendency to derive the complex from the simple, uncritically, and to regard the historical succession as the true account of the nature of things, and how they came to be as they are. The present is to be understood through the past, rather than through itself. With respect to value, the overstatement is more misleading, for Dewey sees the significance of the present, in which means and ends are not distinguished as present and future, but tend toward a single, present totality. Here his practice is better than his theory; for the theory of the experimental method throws the emphasis away from the present again and again. In ethics a reference to the future is vital, for the future is the goal of purposive action. But the criterion must be one of present action, not prediction; the future is not of primary importance as the locus of verification for an hypothesis. The great moralist teaches a new concept of present living, not a five-year or a five-century plan for social amelioration. Both means and ends point to the future, but present employment of the one and choice of the other is our primary concern. And the inadequacy of future eventuality as the criterion of value is illustrated by an ancient quarrel; for while the liberal appeals for wisdom to the teaching of future experience, the conservative always retorts cogently with an appeal to the past. There is also the insuperable practical difficulty, so often observed and admitted, of verifying in a complex human situation. The present action is cause, its future consequences are effects, and we shall control the effects as best we can by controlling the causes.

Action has a normative as well as a descriptive significance. The analysis of it will yield not only metaphysical categories, descriptive of man and the rest of nature, but also a criterion of value. Every action exhibits both purpose and satisfaction, but in varying degrees; it is both a means to the realization of purpose in the future, and a present end in itself. When either of these aspects is weak, the experience loses in value. If it is chiefly a means, the action is drudgery, and we wish that we could attain our purpose without such senseless expenditure of time and energy. If it is merely an end, it is in conflict with human nature, which is endeavor; it becomes uninteresting, pointless, something from which we want to escape. We strive for the union of both, for a means is what leads to its end, and an end is what follows on the employment of means. An action which includes both at the

greatest intensity is an activity which is an end in itself just because it is the pursuit of some further value, not yet realized. We may distinguish between action and activity, and say that an action has value so far as it is an activity. In this union of purpose and satisfaction functioning reaches its peak. But to call it simply the thoroughgoing union of means and ends is misleading, so far as the statement suggests a complete, self-sufficient whole, a pattern which is completely organized. This emphasizes esthetic contemplation instead of action. It is the enjoyment of a process, rather than the enjoyment of a finished pattern, that characterizes activity. Thus the concept of action supplies the basis for ethics, as well as metaphysics.

The weakness of methodology, taken as the key to philosophy, is that it stresses experiment and inquiry without telling us what we are looking for. In the sciences, a method is relative to a definite, restricted subject-matter, and a definite body of fact and theory. And so it should be. There is a sense in which the scientific method is the only method, but this is a sense so general as to be only another name for thinking itself. Apart from this most general sense, different branches of inquiry or intellectual activity have their own peculiar methods, and there is something peculiar and unique about the methods of each individual investigator. So too in philosophy; each philosophy has its own method, or rather is a distinctive way of thinking about philosophical problems. An isolated methodology is neither philosophy nor science. The opinion that in philosophy methodology should stand alone is due to the mistaken belief that if we go beyond method we shall fall into dogmatism, and beg the very questions that the method was designed to investigate. This opinion is due to a misconception of the main issue of today, which is not whether we should start with mind or with nature, or whether subject or object is more important. The controversies of the last hundred years have proved that these ways of stating problems lead toward insoluble difficulties, and away from fruitful investigation. The issue today is, whether we regard the process of experiencing, which includes both mind and nature, or its results, as primary. But if, with pragmatism, we hold that the process is more important than the result, it does not follow that the process is to be identified with a method. Rather, we must look for the result, the constructive doctrine, within the process itself.

Pragmatism has clearly shown the experimental and tentative character of human thought, and in so doing it has given definite expression to an attitude which has been growing all through modern times. It has also seen that the mind does not act on nature

from without, and that the experimental nature of thinking implies rather an individual acting in an environmental situation. But its analysis of action has been restricted to a disentanglement of the steps involved in the experimental method; it has not given us an account of what action is, only of what it does in terms of predictive science. The reason for this is the too great influence of the natural sciences. For just as science presupposes certain concepts, and goes on to study their exemplifications and consequences in nature, in various detailed ways, so pragmatism, and especially instrumentalism, has presupposed the concept of action or experiment, and gone on to describe the various applications of experimentation, and to prophesy the results which would follow from still wider application. It therefore remains to ask what action is in itself; the question is demanded by the present state of pragmatism. In the answer will be found a metaphysics which portrays, better than those of the past have done, the process in the nature of things and an ethics which reflects the real character of human conduct and endeavor.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series, Vol. XXXIX, 1938–1939. London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1939. 286 pp. 25 s.

Hume and Present Day Problems. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XVIII. London: Harrison & Sons., Ltd. 1939. xxxiv + 228 pp. 15 s.

Many of this series of Aristotelian papers may be considered as chapters in more prolonged debates, though they are also, in many cases, of real interest in themselves. Several papers contain attacks on logical positivism, notably those by Max Black, Professor L. S. Stebbing, and, with more sympathy, Karl Britton. But still better are the general criticisms of positivism by Professor John Laird, and I. Berlin's critique of verifiability. Dr. Reginald Jackson's "Are There Analytic Propositions?" seems more subtle than illuminating.

Professor G. F. Stout gives the Presidential Address on the subject, "Phenomenalism." He says that Dr. Johnson was right when he kicked the stone. Immediate experience refutes phenomenalism. The table is *seen* to stretch under the book; the house seen through the window pane *looks* larger than the pane. Pro-

fessor R. I. Aaron continues the same topic later, criticizing Stout for inadequacy. Aaron's own criticism of phenomenalism is one of the best things in the volume. Professor Dingle, somewhat on the other side, presents, in "The Philosophical View-point of a Scientist," his solipsist or subjectivist attitude. The self is always present; the perceived object is always in the past. Science takes the practical world apart, and puts it together in new ways. But he is not satisfied, as yet, what to do with ethics. Dingle is, of course, interesting to compare with the even more Kantian views in Eddington's recent volume.

Mr. A. E. Duncan-Jones presents an interesting ethical dilemma in his paper on "Freedom." Complete indeterminism is rejected by all. But if we have complete determinism, responsibility can not be given a consistent definition, from the point of view of ethics. If we have partial indeterminism, ethical responsibility again can not be defined. Therefore, responsibility is, on any supposition, a meaningless word. The conclusion follows, I think, only if determinism meant the same on both horns of the dilemma. Unfortunately, there are more than one sort of determinism, and the sorts may even be inconsistent with one another. Also, the denial that partial indeterminism is consistent with moral responsibility is usually proved by assuming that any sort of indeterminism involves a break of continuity, as, for instance, between one's character and one's acts. I recall Professor Walter Everett's book, *Moral Values,* as containing a good example of this type of proof. But it is quite obviously fallacious. Continuity and determinism are not the same thing. The top of a house, of course, has to be built upon, and be continuous with, the foundations. But when the foundations are laid, it does not follow that every room and gable of the house is thereby so determined that the owner or architect can make no subsequent alterations in the plans. Most new houses would cost less if this were so.

The *Supplementary Volume* begins with an excellent Inaugural Address by Norman Kemp Smith, in which he indicates that the center of Hume's *Treatise* is in Books II and III, to which Book I was intended to be merely introductory. Professor Kemp Smith defends the further opinion that it was real theoretical doubts, and not fear of prejudicing people against him, which led to the changes in the *Enquiries.*

The last two of the following symposia seem to me the more valuable. That on "The Moral Good as a Relation between Persons" is started rather obscurely by Mr. J. W. Phillips, but Professors Macbeath and Hallett manage to clarify Phillips, and join

issue with him. It is surprising that so apparently simple an ethical question could give rise to so much dialectic.

The symposium on Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* by Professors A. E. Taylor, John Laird, and T. E. Jessop suffers from the fact that each speaker goes his own way with no regard for the others. The result is three good independent estimates of Hume, A. E. Taylor's being much the most unfavorable. Laird even finds some good in Hume.

H. T. C.

Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of Truth *and Plato's* Parmenides *translated with an Introduction and a running Commentary.* FRANCIS MACDONALD CORNFORD. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1939. xvii + 251 pp. $3.75.

This is a useful volume bringing together a classic source and a classic critique of Eleaticism for mutual reference and comparison. The two parts are connected by a brief chapter on "Zeno and Pythagorean Atomism," showing the essential weaknesses in the reasoning of Parmenides which Plato wished to expose in his dialogue. The author has followed the same procedure that he employed so instructively in his editions of the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist,* and the *Timaeus,*[1] interspersing his translation with critical and historical comments.

Professor Cornford's interpretation of the Eleatic doctrine is based on Burnet's conception of Parmenides as "a dissident Pythagorean." His poem is taken to be an attack on the initial assumption which early Pythagorean cosmology had shared with the Milesian speculations, namely, that a manifold world emerges out of an original unity. Parmenides contended that the assumption was self-contradictory in attributing "Being" to that which is not, and "Not-being" to that which is. In the "Way of Truth" he deduced the attributes of the real from three premises: (1) "that which is, is, and cannot not-be; that which is not, is not, and cannot be"; (2) "that which is can be thought or known, and uttered or truly named; that which is not, cannot"; (3) "that which is, is one and cannot be many." In the second part of his poem, the "Way of Seeming," he proceeded to construct *his own* cosmogony in order to give a plausible account of the visible world and its parts, which he assumed nevertheless to be entirely illusory.

[1] *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (New York, 1935); *Plato's Cosmology* (New York, 1937).

> The story is "plausible," but not true; and he knows exactly where the error comes in. It is not an alternative to the Way of Truth, for the Way of Truth is not a cosmogony, but stops short where cosmogony must begin. The Way of Seeming is a continuation, but an illegitimate continuation, vitiated by the mortal leap. . . . Parmenides stands alone in his candid admission that his rational unity will not explain irrational appearances, but is irreconcilable with them. Hence his system is presented in two chapters, separated by a gap which he does not pretend to have bridged and even declares to be impassable. [P. 51.]

Plato's Theory of Forms was an attempt to bridge this gap by means of a doctrine of the "participation" of the world of appearances in the world of true reality. For he could not follow Parmenides in regarding the former as entirely illusory. But he chose him as imaginary critic of his own theory, among all the other presocratic philosophers, because he felt himself in fundamental agreement with him on the distinction, if not the connection, between the intelligible and the sensible worlds.

In line with this approach to the dialogue, Professor Cornford interprets the first part of the *Parmenides* as an Eleatic criticism of Plato's doctrine of "participation." The objections are founded on the "separation" of the Forms, which is "explicitly effected in the *Phaedo*. If I may express dogmatically an opinion about a much disputed matter, I would say that in no earlier dialogue is there a single expression definitely implying that the common character (εἶδος) exists apart from the many things possessing it. But in the *Phaedo* this doctrine is skilfully led up to by a series of steps. It is entailed by the belief in Anamnesis" (p. 74). Although the *aporiae* are left unanswered, the intent of the whole argument in the first part is to show

> (1) that participation is not to be understood in the gross material sense that a Form is a substance, *parts* of which are distributed among any number of things; (2) that the Form nevertheless has an independent existence and is not "a thought in a mind"; and (3) that it can stand to the individual instances in a relation analogous to that of original to copy, which includes, but is not identical with, the relation of Likeness. [P. 95.]

The second part of the dialogue is a "dialectical exercise" in which Plato exposes the ambiguities in the terms "the One" and "being" (with their correlatives, "the Others" and "not-being") in order to correct the fallacies in the eristic arguments against plurality and change. All of these ambiguities result from a failure to distinguish clearly between significant predication, affirmative or negative, and existential assertion or denial; a confusion of the "is," represented by Plato's μετέχει, with "is" meaning "exists." The eight (or nine) "hypotheses" amount to little more than definitions of the different senses in which the terms "the

One'' and ''the Others'' are to be understood, so that different consequences are deducible according to the context.

It was from the *Parmenides* and from countless discussions to which it must have given rise that Aristotle learnt the maxim he so often repeats: ''One'' and ''being'' are used in many senses (τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν πολλαχῶς λέγεται). But whereas Aristotle as a rule sets out with a systematic enumeration of the meanings of the ambiguous terms, Plato makes his point by an indirect procedure. Faithful to Socrates, he would rather make us think for ourselves than tell us what to think. So he confronts his students here with a problematical exposition which may well have baffled the intelligence of those who were less acute than Aristotle himself. . . . We shall miss Plato's whole intention, if we assume beforehand that ''the One'' must stand all through for the same thing, and then identify it with the One Being of Parmenides, or the Neoplatonic One (or Ones), or the Hegelian Absolute, or the universe, or the unity of the real, or the Platonic Form. The consequence of presuming a constant meaning has been that the arguments have appeared to be very largely either fallacious or meaningless. . . . In a modern book it would be natural, in certain contexts, to substitute letters, e.g. ''*A*'' for ''the One'' and ''not-*A*,'' or ''*B*,'' or some such symbol for ''the Others.'' The opening paragraph of an Hypothesis would then state that ''*A*'' stands for ''the One'' in the sense there defined, or ''not-*A*'' or ''*B*,'' etc., for ''the Others'' in the appropriate sense. . . . Until the definition has been stated, the terms are just as much blank cheques as the symbols *A* and *B*.'' [Pp. 110–113.]

The writer of this review put forward a similar interpretation of the ''dialectical exercise'' in a study of the *Parmenides*, published some fifteen years ago, suggesting that ''most of the obscurity that has troubled critics of the *Parmenides* is due . . . to the attempt to read a profound ontological meaning into terms that stand here as little more than algebraic symbols.'' It is gratifying to find independent confirmation of the same ''principles of interpretation'' from no less an authority than Professor Cornford.

D. S. M.

The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century. PERRY MILLER. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1939. xi + 528 pp. $3.75.

The detailed anatomy of American Puritanism is skilfully laid bare by Professor Miller in this first volume in ''a projected series upon the intellectual history of New England to extend through the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.'' Fortunately the book will receive elsewhere the extended treatment which its general importance warrants. For it deals magisterially with ''the most coherent and most powerful single factor in the early history of America,'' that unified body of thought to which the first three generations of New Englanders ''paid almost unbroken allegiance.'' The author carries out, under the witty headings of

"Religion and Learning," "Cosmology," "Anthropology," and "Sociology," a topical analysis of the leading ideas of Puritanism, treating the whole of its literature "as though it were the product of a single intelligence." This method has decided philosophical advantages, but also its drawbacks; since chronology and individual differences are frankly slighted in the interest of the main pattern, an approach that will probably have to be abandoned in the later volumes. The intricate and costly problem of complete documentation has been solved by depositing in the Harvard Library an annotated copy with a bound set of detailed references. Professor Miller has laid the broad foundation of what may well be a towering edifice of contemporary scholarship. No one seriously interested in American philosophy can afford to give less than his best attention to this book.

H. A. L.

A History of English Philosophy. W. R. SORLEY. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1937. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1939. xvi + 380 pp. $2.75.

The publishers have now made Sorley's history of English philosophy available in a less expensive edition than that which appeared in 1920. No change in text is made. Though this cheap edition appeared in England two years ago, it was released in the United States as recently as July, 1939. Since the book was reviewed in this JOURNAL upon its appearance (Vol. XVII, 1920, pp. 667–670), no further comment is needed; and the book is of course well known to all interested in the field it covers. While Sorley's history is less useful than Rudolf Metz's book on the last one hundred and fifty years, it still remains the best single work on the whole of British philosophy. And its very fine bibliography of British philosophy is alone more than worth the cost of the book.

S. P. L.

Thomas Carlyle and the Art of History. LOUISE MERWIN YOUNG. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1939. x + 219 pp. $2.00.

This book is in five chapters: they deal with the backgrounds of Carlyle's work in the historians who wrote before him, Carlyle's philosophy of history, his theory of what historical writing ought to be, his art of history in practice, and a concluding estimate. The theme is treated with exhaustive thoroughness. Carlyle's "irrationalism," his theistic view, his moralism, his distrust of democ-

racy, and his interpretation of revolution as the due penalty upon corrupt rulers are set forth with effective quotations from his writings. Corrective is given of a common misunderstanding of Carlyle's emphasis on "heroes." Carlyle, it is said, would have been dismayed if he could have known that within a century he would be better known for *Heroes and Hero Worship* than for the *French Revolution*. Actually Carlyle's interest lay chiefly in "the inward life and the spiritual condition of a people" (p. 128). And the emphasis on heroes was a supplementary rather than a controlling matter. It was due, not so much to a romantic flair, as to a realistic sense of the fact that if there be history there are actions and if there be actions there are men who act. Thus recognition of heroes is rejection of "trends" and "tendencies" as explanatory forces.

The book indicates that its author has sympathy with "the great literary historians" (cf. p. 170). In this sympathy I share. I was a bit troubled, however, by the suggestion that, while the historian's facts are "objective," his use of them makes his product into "a subjective entity, dependent on the 'cast of mind' of the historian" (p. 54). As we must admit that any statement of fact is but probable, so must we not view any interpretation as a conjectural meaning that seeks and may find confirmation? Is then the alleged distinction between objective and subjective anything more than one between statements already well verified and other statements awaiting verification?

S. P. L.

Die philosophische Grundlehre. Eine Studie zur Kritik der Ontologie. RUDOLF ZOCHER. (Beiträge zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, 6.) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1939. viii + 132 pp. 7.20 M.

This work examines the question of the relative primacy of epistemology or of ontology. The problem is discussed in terms of the current conflict in Germany between the new ontologism (as represented by Heidegger, Hartmann, and others) and neo-critical philosophies. The author attempts to effect a reconciliation between these tendencies by uncovering a critical foundation for ontology. This pre-ontological discipline consists in a limited Criticism which is akin to the starting point of Rickert. As the author ably points out, Rickert's philosophy is not hostile to ontology as such; for him, as for Rickert, it is only necessary to reject an "un-critical" ontology. He sketches the methods and problems of this basic philosophic discipline, and points toward the characteristics which an ontology founded on such a discipline will possess.

M. M.

Avoir une âme: essai sur les existences virtuelles. ÉTIENNE SOURIAU. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1938. (Annales de l'Université de Lyon, Lettres, III, 5.) 141 pp.

L'instauration philosophique. ÉTIENNE SOURIAU. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1939. (Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine.) 414 pp. 60 francs.

Only the circumstance of common authorship justifies a joint notice of these two volumes by Professor Souriau of the University of Lyons. For the first is an almost rhapsodical series of attempts to capture in words the elusive meaning of that unfashionable word "soul." The author uses his marked literary gifts to good effect in numerous interpolated passages, which furnish concrete examples to illuminate his twenty-four propositions on the nature of the soul. In terms drawn largely from music, the soul is a harmony, the resolving number which unites the opposites generated by man's ideal-but-conditioned life.

The larger work is a more closely reasoned attempt, rich in references to the history of European philosophy, to escape from the contemporary delusion that each race or nationality has its own philosophical outlook which is impervious to external criticism, and to restore the prestige of a common philosophical enterprise governed, in spite of individual stylistic variations, by certain "universal architectonic laws." Subject-matter varies from generation to generation and from country to country, but not the form which the philosopher endeavors to give to it, a form which constantly enhances its reality and "exhaustive complexity."

H. A. L.

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Thomas, Milton Halsey: A Bibliography of John Dewey, 1882–1939. With an Introduction by Herbert W. Schneider. New York: Columbia University Press. Second edition, revised and enlarged. 1939. xviii + 264 pp. $3.00.

McFadden, Charles J.: The Philosophy of Communism. Preface by Fulton J. Sheen. New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc. 1939. xx + 345 pp. $3.50.

Singh, Sardar Sir Jogendra: The Persian Mystics. The Invocations of Sheikh 'Abdullāh Ansāri of Herat, A.D. 1005–1090. (The Wisdom of the East Series.) New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc. 1939. 59 pp.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. Volume I, Number I. Reflections on the History of Ideas: *A. O. Lovejoy.* Byron and the

Modern World: *Bertrand Russell.* Polybius and the American Constitution: *Gilbert Chinard.* The Significance of Religious Writings in the English Renaissance: *L. B. Wright.* The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism: *Hans Kohn.* The National Idea in France before the Revolution: *R. R. Palmer.* Notes and Documents: Abstract Ideas in the Mosaics of Antioch: *Glanville Downey.* Copernicus and Mechanics: *Edgar Zilsel.* Book Review: Perry Miller's *New England Mind: H. W. Schneider.*

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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Volume 7, Number I. What Is a Monad? *W. M. Malisoff.* Philosophy and Science: *Otis Lee.* The Purpose of Philosophy: *Arthur Lapan.* Two Kinds of Certainty: *D. L. Miller.* Science: Public or Private? *P. W. Bridgman.* The Distinction between "Mechanics" and "Mechanism": *J. E. Turner.* Peirce's Treatment of Induction: *T. A. Goudge.* Charles S. Peirce, Pioneer of Modern Empiricism: *Ernest Nagel.* Particulars, Universals and Verification: *Bruce Waters.* The Fluxive Fallacy: *L. J. Lafleur.* Some Consequences of the Positivistic Interpretation of Physics: *A. V. Bushkovitch.* Modern Mathematics and Some Problems of Quantity, Quality, and Motion in Economic Analysis: *K. H. Niebyl.* History and Biological Evolution: *Edgar Zilsel.*

THE PERSONALIST. Winter, 1940. One View of Theism: *R. T. Flewelling.* Philosophy as a Science: *Thomas Greenwood.* Professor Macintosh and Empirical Theology: *R. C. Miller.* Personalism and Catholic Theology: *J. S. Moore.* The Philosophical Background of Chinese Painting: *Yu-Shan Han.* The Philosophy of Poetry: *William Hester.*

PHILOSOPHY. Vol. XV, No. 57. With Whom Are We at War? *J. H. Muirhead.* The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy: *H. H. Price.* Ethics, Christianity, and Nationalism: *C. C. J. Webb.* Hegel and Prussianism: *T. M. Knox.* Is There a Social Contract? (I): *H. D. Lewis.* Philosophical Survey: Nihilism in Germany.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 46e Année, No. 4. A Monsieur Henri Bergson. Tricentenaire de Racine: Hommage de la philosophie: *J. Benda.* Pour le 250e anniversaire de Montesquieu: Remarques sur la méthode de Montesquieu: *G. Davy.* La notion du devenir historique dans la philosophie de Montesquieu: *R. Hubert.* La sociologie juridique de Montesquieu: *G.*

Gurvitch. Pour le Cencinquantenaire de la Révolution française. La conquête de la liberté spirituelle: *J. R. Carré.* Pour le Contenaire de Théodule Ribot: *P. Janet.* Pour le Centenaire d'Alfred Fouillée: *J. Petrovici.*

BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE. 38e Année, No. 4. L'agrégation de philosophie. Exposé: *M. G. Friedmann.* Discussion.

THEORIA. Volume V, Part III. Les paradoxes de l'histoire de la philosophie: *Bernard Groethuysen.* Contribution to the Problem of the Sentiment of Guilt: *Åke Petzäll.* Begriffsanalyse und kritischer Idealismus (I): *Ingemar Hedenius.*

ARCHIVIO DI FILOSOFIA. Anno IX, Fasc. III. La logicità del pensiero occidentale: *A. Pastore.* Dopo la filosofia dell' esistenza: *A. Guzzo.* L'ultima fase del pensiero di Bernardino Varisco: Dall'uomo a Dio: *U. Redanò.* L'estetica di Vincenzo Gioberti e il suo ontologismo: *V. De Ruvo.*

NOTES AND NEWS

We regret to learn of the death of Dr. Charles Augustus Strong at Fiesole, Italy, on January 23rd, at the age of 77.

We take pleasure in announcing the appearance of the first number of the new *Journal of the History of Ideas,* and take this occasion to extend our congratulations and best wishes to its editors. Inquiries should be addressed to the managing editor, Dr. Philip P. Wiener at the College of the City of New York. Other members of the Board of Editors are Arthur O. Lovejoy, editor; Joseph T. Shipley, assistant editor; associate editors: Crane Brinton, Gilbert Chinard, Morris R. Cohen, Francis W. Coker, Richard P. McKeon, Perry Miller, Marjorie H. Nicolson, John Herman Randall, Jr., J. Salwyn Schapiro, and Louis B. Wright. The contents of the first number will be found under "Other New Books and Journals."

There has been a long-felt want for such a periodical, and students of the history of philosophy owe a debt of gratitude to the editors as well as to the alumni and trustees of the College of the City of New York for making it possible.